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Comparative Case Study on Institutionalization of Ruling Parties Under Military Authoritarianism: Democratic Republican Party Under Park Chung-Hee Regime in South Korea (1961-1979) and GOLKAR Under Suharto Regime in Indonesia (1966-1998)

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Abstract

South Korea and Indonesia have experienced similar military political interventions and coups which brought a long military authoritarian regime. Strong military authoritarian regime with their own ruling parties could last for 18 years in South Korea and 32 years in Indonesia. In South Korea, Park Chung-hee Regime ended in 1979 when he was murdered by his subordinates, which was followed by the dissolution of the ruling party, Democratic Republican Party (Jeong, 2009, p. 29). Whereas in Indonesia, the reform movement with socio-political instability by the economic crisis in 1997 resulted the collapse of Suharto's hegemony and authoritarian regime in 1998 while the ruling party, Golkar still exists today. This study aims to find answers to why there have been differences in the end of both parties, related with the political party institutionalization. And this study would like to show that the Democratic Republican Party failed to be institutionalized while the Golkar Party could survive and win the election again. Thus, this study would like to say that the level of institutionalization must be different in the Democratic Republican Party and the Golkar Party.

Keywords: Democratic Republican Party, GOLKAR, Indonesia, Institutionalization of Political Party, Military Authoritarian Regime, Ruling Party, South Korea

1. Introduction

1.1 Research Problem

After World War II, a common phenomenon found in many newly independent Asian countries was military political intervention such as a coup. Due to a lack of democratic political experience and social instability,

almost all newly independent countries in Asia have experienced direct political intervention and enormous political influence by the military, and military political dominance has continued in several countries so far (Handelman, 1996, p. 186). South Korea in Northeast Asia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia have very different environments such as language, religion and race, but both countries have very similar historical backgrounds. In addition to similar experiences in economic development and democratization, these two countries have experienced similar military interventions and military coups that have brought long authoritarian regime. President Park Chung-hee carried out a military coup in 1961 in South Korea and was elected as the 2nd president in 1963. President Suharto, Indonesia's 2nd president, took supreme political power in 1966 by Supersemar (Eleventh March Order: Sequence Eleventh March), and became president of Indonesia in 1968. The time gap between the two regimes was about five years apart from the start, but there was homogeneity which led to a long authoritarian regime with a strong military background. Through their direct or indirect military coup, General Park Chung-hee ruled for 18 years and General Suharto ruled for 32 years. Even if military political intervention in political parties in two countries looked very similar, each ruling party finally had a big difference at the end. When there was a new military coup after the death of Park Chung-hee in South Korea in 1979, the Democratic Republican Party was dismissed by a new military elite group (Woo, 2011). However, in Indonesia, President Suharto was able to hand over his presidency to Vice President Habibie in 1998 without collisions between elite groups in the military or massive bloodshed on the streets. Indeed, Golkar could return to normal political party and has survived so far.

1.2 Importance of the Problem

From historical background and the problems that have been presented, the research question is why the military needed political parties after taking power, and how did they institutionalize Democratic Republicans in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia? And when facing the crisis of the regime, how did the political party institutionalization affect ends of the Democratic Republic Party in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia?

1.3 Relevant Scholarship

Huntington saw the party system develops in four stages. The first step is stage of factionalism, the second one is the stage of the polarization, the expansion phase is the third stage, and the fourth stage is political institutionalization with acquiring the value and stability of the party organization (Huntington, 1968, p. 217).

Table 1. Progress of political institutionalization

Step	Stage	Characteristics
Step 1	Factionalism	* Political participation and institutionalization is very low. * The absence of detailed modern political organizations. * Lack of homogeneity, very low bonding, lack of permanence. * a small number of people in organizations compete. * Focusing on a group interests like the level of family or relatives.
Step 2	Polarization	* Political participation begins to develop. * Polarization in existing factions by emergence of new socio-political forces, and polarization in new forces as well. * Formation of political parties, which means conversion of traditional factionalism into social forces. * Polarization is a signal and the starting point of party politics.
Step 3	Enhancement	* Formed political parties attract popularity and public support through effective party composition. * Strong political motivation including regime control and reorganization of the social order. Expansion of political participation through internal political struggles. * By a typical pattern of party development in the West, small faction groups developed into larger factions and attracted new supporters into politics. * Expansion of formation of political parties and political participation through new strength and support.
Step 4	Institutionalization	* Completion of a party system for growing. * Formation and completion of political party systems into three types: the dominant system by one party, the two-party system, and the multi-party system.

		* From the dominant system of one party, it develops into a multi-party system that can bring alternatives and control the system together. This can replace government policy and private leadership from the dominant one-party system. * Not relying on personal leadership by certain leaders but have several generation replacement candidates in various organizations. * Political stability and political vitality can be secured for a long time.

Huntington defines institutionalization as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. Institutionalization is necessary for political parties to acquire and sustain value and stability. Huntington argues that the degree of institutionalization of all political systems can be judged by adaptability, complexity, autonomy, coherence of its organizations and procedures. It means if these elements can be identified and measured, the political system can be described as institutionalized systems. It is also possible to measure level of institutionalization of a political party as well (Huntington, 1968, pp. 13-24).

Table 1. Factors of political institutionalization

Criteria	Non-institutionalized party	Institutionalized party
Adaptability-Rigidity	* Institutional and organizational permanence is short. * Little or no case of generation replacement, and the history of generation replacement is short. * The purpose and function of party existence is simple, and it is difficult to adapt to change.	* Institutional and organizational permanence is long. * Generational replacement is common, and generational replacement has a long history. * The purpose and function of party existence vary, and adaptation to change is fast.
Complexity-Simplicity	* The organization is simple, there is no functional differentiation, and there is no subdivided subsystem.	* Organizations are complex, hierarchical and functionally divided and have subdivided subsystems.
Autonomy-Subordination	* Non-autonomously, very vulnerable to external influences. * Lack of development of autonomous political organizations and institutions. * Represents interests of certain social groups such as families, tribes, and classes. * Lack of verification about new political forces.	* Autonomous organization characteristics are not influenced by external factors. * Highly developed political organizations and institutions. * Well separated from interests of certain social groups such as families, tribes, and classes. * Enough verification steps about new candidates and political powers.
Coherence-Disunity	* Not integrated but fragmented. * Weak with external impacts. * Organizational discipline is unclear.	* Integrated and strong. * Strong from external impacts. * Organizational discipline is unclear like a military.

1.4 Research Design

This study aims to study differences in political party institutionalization under military authoritarian regime in South Korea and Indonesia and will examine in more detail how these differences in institutionalization affected the sustainability of each political party. The reason for choosing two countries is the military authoritarian regime which began with the same historical background, causing the two ruling political parties, Democratic Republican Parties in South Korea and GOLKAR in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2011, p. 12). In order to achieve this purpose, I will first examine establishment background and purpose of two parties. Moreover, I would like to compare and analyze the leadership of each party, the organizational structure, the autonomy level, party policy operation, campaign funding, election strategy and legislative activities in the National Assembly, and the relationship and cooperation structure with the military. The institutionalization of each party is measured based on flexibility, complexity, autonomy and coherence factors of the party which are the basic elements of the measure of party institutionalization argued by Samuel P. Huntington.

2. Method

This research will be conducted using a type of analytic descriptive research that seeks to describe complex social realities through simplification and classification by utilizing concepts to explain an analytic political phenomenon. In terms of simplifying the complexity of political reality, a qualitative approach in this study is carried out without going through hypothesis testing such as ordinary quantitative research. However, to facilitate understanding and relatively accurate analysis, a general assumption is needed to explain the relationship of the influential variables in this study. Furthermore, this research will be effective when carried out by relying on official data such as statistics and political indicators that are recognized in South Korea and Indonesia. This study is a literature study that collects, classifies, and analyzes data and other materials related to the above problems both in the form of documents, books, journals, periodical scientific magazines, newspapers, magazines, pages on websites and field research.

3. Result

In South Korea and Indonesia, political involvement of the military took place through similar processes at similar times. As a result, the military authoritarian regime came into being, and the president from the military took long term power. The military authoritarian regime actively utilized political parties to justify their ruling. South Korea launched the Democratic Republican Party and Indonesia used the functional group "Golongan Karya: Golkar" as a rulling party. Despite establishing political parties for similar purposes, the institutionalization of the two parties differed significantly, and this difference in institutionalization resulted in quite different results for the duration of the two parties.

3.1 The Process of Taking Over Power by the Military

Of the ways in which the military intervenes in politics, the most obvious and effective method is to intervene in the state's political institution. The military intervention in this political institution appears to be more aggressive in countries where democracy is not firmly established. The military usually likes to place military personnel in the executive, legislative and judicial branches, or establish special military institutions which can intervene in elections and control the government (Mietzner, 2011, p. 4). The military of South Korea and Indonesia had same form of political intervention, too. The military of South Korean which took power in 1961 and the military of Indonesia who took power by suppression against Indonesia Communist Party in 1965 succeeded in legitimizing themselves and establishing a long-term regime by winning elections through political parties. In this chapter, we will look into process of seizing power by the military and establishing ruling parties, the Democratic Republican Party in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia.

3.1.1 May 16 coup and military government in South Korea

Early on the morning of May 16, 1961, more than 3,500 military forces captured all broadcasting stations, power plants, police stations and major government offices. At 5 o'clock in the morning, there was an announcement of the coup on behalf of the Army Chief of Staff Chang Do-yong. The soldiers who succeeded in carrying out the coup without resistance were the 8th graduates of the Korean Military Academy. Park Chung-hee's coup represents the ruler type of the political intervention model by Eric. A. Nordlinger (Nordlinger, 1977: pp. 22-27). They asked for two years for the military government. They stated that they would surrender political power to the civilian government within two years after correcting corruption and the inability of society and the state. However, several officers, including Colonel Kim Jong-pil, secretly planned to establish a ruling party to keep the military authoritarian regime and take power through general elections. However, their coup was not a military coup as a national institution, but as one faction in the military, and the first priority task was to expel opposition from the military first. This shows that factionalism and internal confrontation within the Korean military have played a leading role in the May 16 Military coup.

3.1.2 Suharto's Takeover of Sukarno's Power

The end of the Old Order power which was identified with the Soekarno government could not be separated from the G30S(Gerakan 30 September: 30 September Movement) by PKI(Partai Komunis Indonesia: Communist Party of Indonesia) in 1965. This event not only made the fall of the Soekarno power regime, but also this was done by Suharto to purge the PKI movement and its mass organizations. According to Harold Crouch, Suharto's massive actions following the G30S / PKI were motivated by two things (Crouch, 1978, pp. 158-178). The first motive was to reverse unfavorable political situation and destroy the PKI forces who were strong and close to President Sukarno. The second motive was more strategic and political. With the presence of Suharto as Kamtibmas in handling the G30S / PKI events, it will attract attention from various groups, which can create a sense of solidarity and increase Suharto's legitimacy. Finally, this motivation and political purpose succeeded to make Soekarno to sign the March 11 (Supersemar) Order (Notosusanto, Saleh, 1991, pp. 16-23). On 12 March 1966, the Kostrad(Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat: Army Strategic Command) / Kopkamtib(Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban: Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) Commander Maj. Gen. Suharto received a Letter Order 11 March from President Soekarno. The contents of the warrant were giving Suharto mandate to control the government and maintain the safety of the president. One of the implementations of Supersemar was that Suharto immediately dissolved the PKI and its mass organizations. Suharto's actions received broad support from anticommunist civil forces outside and within parliament. The prohibition and dissolution of the PKI and its mass organizations was then legitimized through the law of MPRS TAP No. XXV / MPRS / 1966 which was issued on July 5, 1966. In addition, the MPRS also gave Suharto authority to form a cabinet on July 5, 1966. That day, the MPRS revoked Sukarno's title as a lifetime president. Then on February 20, 1967, Suharto tried to convince President Sukarno and his supporters that the power of the Sukarno regime was over and would be replaced by a new regime, the Suharto regime. Finally, President Sukarno gave Suharto executive power on February 22, 1966. After surrender of Sukarno's political power, the MPRS(Majelis Permusaywaratan Rakyat Sementara: Temporary People's Consultative Assembly) revoked President Soekarno's power and appointed Suharto as an acting president. This action was stated in the TAP MPRS No. XXXIII in 1967. John Roosa said in his book "Pretext for Mass Murder" that Suharto used G30S as a pretext to delegitimize Sukarno's power and push himself into the presidency. According to Roosa, Suharto's takeover of state power could be called a creeping coup d'état. He argued Suharto finished taking over state power from Sukarno behind the veil of legal procedures, which disguised the coup as an effort supported by Sukarno with pretext of preventing a coup by the PKI (Roosa, 2006, p. 32).

3.2 Strengthening Ruling Ideologies to Keep Power

The military in South Korea which took control of the state through a coup tried to strengthen its ideology with an anti-communism ideology aimed at national security and developmentalism. The military in Korea at that time wanted to institutionalize the ideology with following reasons. First reason was to secure the legitimacy of the military coup and military government in terms of the security crisis and anti-communism under the structure of the armistice. The Park Chung-Hee regime also tried to strengthen anti-communism education, its relationship with the United States and push forward with the modernization of the army by anti-communism as its basic ideology. Second reason was to create good relations between the United States and South Korea, which needs an anti-communist ideology to consolidate an alliance with the United States. Besides that, like the military regimes around the world in general, the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea tried to use developmentalism as a basic ideology and actively used it to keep the regime. Of course, the main purpose of using developmentalism was to secure the legitimacy of the coup and government (Jeong, 2009, pp. 133-141). In Indonesia, ideology tends to be developed as a comprehensive doctrine. The dominant view by the New Order government was Pancasila is the norm and value. Pancasila is a belief system or ideology that determines how things should be. The type of political system and the structure of dominance were also developed from understanding the ideology of Pancasila as this comprehensive doctrine. In Langenberg's words, the New Order was a state system combined together with executive, military, police, parliament, bureaucracy and court, which built a hegemony with the formulation of ideology as its pillar since 1965/1966 (Van Langenberg, 1990, p. 123). By formulation of the Pancasila ideology as an organic totality, all social and political organizations were led by

law to accept Pancasila as the only philosophical basis since 1985, and every citizen who ignores the Pancasila or any social organization which rejects Pancasila as a single principle will be labeled as a traitor or agitator. Pancasila by crystallization of the Indonesian cultural values, continued its existence in the New Order era by the government (Jaya, 2012, p. 8) Hence, the government formally also socialized the values of Pancasila through rule of the TAP MPR NO II / MPR / 1978 concerning Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4: Guidelines for Living Up and Practicing Pancasila) for schools and in the community. Students, social organizations, and state institutions were required to carry out upgrading P4 (Maftuh, 2008, p. 134).

3.3 Military in Parties and the National Assembly

To secure the legitimacy and stabilize governance in South Korea, Park Chung-hee Regime provided a systematic political recruitment for military officers to enter parliament. In 1963, in the 6th general election, 31 retired generals were elected as 17.7% of the total members of the National Assembly, and those reached up to 21.1% of the total members of the National Assembly from the 7th general election in 1967. In the 4th Republic was formed through amendments to the Constitution in 1972, members of the National Assembly including many military officers were appointed by the president, and members of the National Assembly from the military numbered were 37 people, 16% of the total members of the National Assembly opened after the 10th general election in 1978. Among 172 ministers of the 3rd Republic, 73 people were from the military as many as 42.4%. Next in the 4th Republic, 45 people came from the military, which was 31.7% of 142 ministers. The Deputy Minister, 23 of 145 people came from the military as many as 15.9% in the 3rd Republic, and 20 from 121 people from the military as many as 16.5% in the 4th Republic (Jeong, 2009, pp. 174-178). On the other hand, in Indonesia, during the Old Order Era, Indonesian military had showed disappointment towards political elites who were considered to have weakened the country. Thus, the concept of "Middle Road Concept" was born by General A.H. Nasution in 1958, which became known as the "Dual Function," justifying the military to intervene politics (Suryadinata, 1971, p. 1). Military dominance in Indonesian politics since 1965 has been changed by the relationship between the military and civilians, and between the military, scholars and students. This relationship also affected the Indonesian political system at the same time and got results from 1971 election. It could be happened by existence of dual function in important positions like governors, regents and village heads in people's lives. The military also had a hierarchical network from province to district. The military didn't need to compete in elections with other candidates, but they just could order people to choose a party or organization by its dominant power in local area (Said, 2002, p. 55). The role of the bureaucracy and ABRI(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia: Indonesian military including the police) in Golkar can be seen in how they worked in decision- making procedures at all levels. This mechanism is known as the "three lane" semi-formal mechanism, namely A / ABRI, B / Bureaucracy, and G / Golkar, reducing diversity in Golkar (Haris, 1998, pp. 189-190). ABRI also entered various government structures, BUMN(Badan Usaha Milik Negara: State-owned company), and villages with various organizational forms and positions. The bureaucracy was used by the New Order regime to help Golkar win in elections. It can be said ABRI and the bureaucracy were political machines for political mobilization in the Suharto regime as well as the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea.

3.4 Weakening Parliament to Keep Power

In the 1960s in South Korea, the Park Chung-hee Regime tried to strengthen the executive branch for stronger power of the president. Since the 3rd Republic in 1963, the military authoritarian regime had strengthened structure of the executive brand, and they filled government with people based on personal relationships or the same geographical place as a hometown. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Security Command had been mobilized to gather information about the entire community and reinforce the president's power. President Park Chung-hee and the government took control of these forces and strengthened for political purpose, keeping the regime. To achieve political purpose, the regime exercised huge control over elections, the media, interest groups, the National Assembly, and the judiciary by force, authority and laws. As a result, although the National Assembly could monitor and control dictatorship of the government with legislative powers by supervising authority and structure of government, there was no way to regulate power when the parliament was weakened, and the government became stronger (Jeong, 2009, p. 209). In Indonesia,

DPR(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia: People's Representative Council) was under control of the executive branch. Democratization of Indonesia could not be achieved as well during the Suharto regime because the president's power became stronger and weakened function and capability of the DPR. The DPR as a legislative branch for checks and balances was only a decorator of the constitutional structure, which worked only to strengthen Suharto's position as president (Gaffar, 1999, p. 293). During the Suharto regime, the DPR and MPR(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat: People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia) carried out their duties under shadow of the executive branch, or only became a spokesperson of the executive branch and then abandoned legislative roles. The executive branch during the era of Suharto regime have a strategic role to strengthen power of the president as like South Korea. The Indonesian parliament, the DPR-MPR, despite having constitutional authority to co-operate with the executive and the judiciary, failed to implement a check and balance mechanism because the legislature and the judiciary were "forced" to support any executive decision (Legowo, 2005, p. 32). In other words, the division of power during the New Order with the concept of "Trias Politica" could not go accordingly.

3.5 Weakening of Regimes and Ideological Failures

The military authoritarian regime which had been in power for a long time also faced a crisis. In South Korea and Indonesia, what factors brought crisis situation to the military authoritarian regime and how did it make the regime to be weakened and declined?

3.5.1 Security, economic and political crises in Korea

The move by the United States to withdraw US troops from South Korea was huge security crisis to South Korea. President Nixon of the United States declared his intention to limit US forces stationed in Asia as part of a policy to reduce Congress pressure and defense spending after the Vietnam War. President Nixon has announced "Asia by the Asians Policy," his decision as part of new Asian policy in July 1969. The point of Nixon's policy was to comply with the defense agreement with allies and provide a nuclear umbrella, but in the end emphasized responsibility of each Asian country's own defense first and South Korea must defend itself against invasion threat from North Korea. There was strong opposition from the South Korean government and the United States parliament against withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, President Park Chung-hee of South Korea warned they would withdraw South Korean troops from the Vietnam War as well. However, President Nixon finally made the 7th US military division to withdraw from the Korean peninsula (Moon, 1994, p. 116). In the process of securing power by creating the Democratic Republican Party for the Park Chung-hee regime, the government and the Democratic Republican Party as the ruling party, planned economic growth and development for their main target to achieve. Because severe poverty was continued even after the independence, this policy of economic growth efforts was certainly fully supported by the community. The ongoing economic development efforts from the 1960s to the death of President Park Chung-hee initially achieved extraordinary unprecedented achievements. But as development continued, imbalances in growth, inequality, and accumulation of foreign debt occurred. The characteristic of industrialization in Korea was a government-intensive & labor-intensive industry that prioritized exports and focused on supplying capital on large conglomerates (Y.-H. Kim, Y.-H. Jung, 1981, p. 160). In terms of politics, long-term seizure of power by the Park Chung-hee's regime failed to exercise power in accordance with the constitution. After the military coup, various political policies emerged, which reduced democratization with controlling the mass media, declaration of martial law, formation of the Military Revolution Committee and the Supreme Council, and social purification measures to eliminate democracy through repression and violence. In the end, failure of developmentalism also led to crisis of the Park Chung-hee regime and the Democratic Republican Party. Moreover, the Democratic Republican Party which used bureaucrats and civilian politicians as instruments of power, could not be developed and institutionalized by itself while the military authoritarian regime exercised overall control.

3.5.2 Economic, Political and Legal Crises in Indonesia

The Indonesian economic crisis reached its peak in 1998, which was marked as -13.1% contraction in economic growth rate. One of main impacts by economic crisis in Indonesia was many fundamental changes in the

economic, social, political and cultural order that could determine direction of the state. This multidimensional crisis was an anticlimax after long success of the Indonesian economy during the New Order era since launch of the First Repelita: 5-year economic development plan in 1969 (Karmeli, 2008, p. 166). In addition, the political crisis that occurred in 1998 was mounting due to various political policies issued by the New Order regime based on implementation of Pancasila democracy for keeping the regime. During the New Order era, political atmosphere was very repressive, namely the existence of strong pressure from the government against the opposition or people who think critically (Fatah, 1998). Facing economic crisis, people demanded to reform in politics as well as economy (Habibie, 2006). In political life, people assume that government pressure on the opposition is very strong, especially seen in harsh treatment against a person or group who oppose or give criticism on policies of the government. In the legal field, the government intervened laws as well, which were often used as a means of justifying the ruler. This fact was contrary to the provisions of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution which states that the judiciary must be independent to the authority of the government (executive). The implementation of the law during the New Order government had many injustices and was not in accordance with the 1945 Constitution because the power of the judiciary was under executive branch. The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) stated that the event was categorized as a gross violation of Human Rights (HAM) committed by Suharto and the New Order regime. These human rights violations were Cases of Buru Island 1965-1966, Mysterious Shooting 1981-1985, Tanjung Priok 1984-1987, Talangsari 1984-1987, Military Operations Area (DOM) in Aceh (1989-1998), Papua DOM (1963 -2003), July 27, 1996, Forced Kidnappings and Disappearances 1997-1998, Trisakti Events May 12, 1998 and Riots on May 13-15, 1998.

3.6 Political Challenges and Shifting Power
Many of the social and political changes and crises discussed previously led to great political challenges for governments and ruling parties and it resulted in changes in political power in both countries. Even if the two regimes faced challenges from civil society similarly, political power shifts were different by institutionalization level of two ruling parties.

3.6.1 Challenges from Opposition Parties and Civil Groups in South Korea
The Democratic Republican Party, which had been solid for 10 years, faced big challenge in the 8th general election in 1971. Although the Democratic Republican Party has made every effort to maintain its long-term regime, the opposition party got a lot of votes by issues of Park Chung-hee regime's long-term power and undue corruption. Another factor in the crisis which the Democratic Republican Party and the government met was civil society which became core of democratization movement along with opposition parties. In the mid-1970s, the Park Chung-hee Regime actively launched security issues to maintain power. As mentioned, the Park Chung-hee Regime faced various civil society and student resistance at the end of the leadership. The government considered to mobilize the military to suppress resistance even if it could cause a lot of sacrifice by suppression. However, when democratization demonstrations became severe and civil society with opposition parties resisted strongly, the Park Chung-hee regime and the ruling party, the Democratic Republican Party gradually collapsed.

3.6.2 Suharto's Leadership Weakness in Indonesia
The political crisis that occurred at the end of the New Order regime was caused by long authoritarian regime and economic crisis. Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia had stated that "Sovereignty is in hands of the people and fully implemented by the MPR." Basically, de jure (legally) the people's sovereignty was carried out by the MPR as representatives of the people, but de facto (in reality) majority of MPR members were appointed based on nepotism. These situation and structure resulted emergence of disbelief on government institutions, the DPR and the MPR, which led reformation movement. The reformation movement demanded to reform in all fields including the membership of the parliament. The demand that President Suharto step down was increasingly voiced by students in various places, and students' movements resulted clashes with security forces. On May 12, 1998, thousands of Trisakti students held a demonstration for Suharto's resignation and re-election for new president. They also demanded the economic recovery which had been hit by a crisis since 1997. Suharto was further shocked when his ministers, led by Akbar Tanjung and Ginandjar Kartasasmita, held a meeting and compiled a statement that they were unwilling to take office in the new cabinet and urged the

President to step down. President Suharto ordered Saadillah Mursjid, Minister of State Secretary, to immediately prepare for process of presidency resignation in a constitutional manner. President Suharto also ordered that his resignation would be carried out at the Merdeka Palace. On Thursday, May 21 in 1998, President Suharto read out his resignation letter, which was followed by Vice President Habibie's succession for presidency (Forrester, 2002, p. 174).

3.7 Changes in Politics and Government Party
The crisis at the end of the military authoritarian regime weakened the ruling party and brought a decisive moment. In particular, changes in political power and role of the ruling party have made it difficult for the ruling party to survive.

3.7.1 Collapse of the Democratic Republican Party
On October 26, 1979, President Park Chung-hee completed his business trip and held a dinner party with Cha Ji-cheol, President's Guards Chief, Kim Ki-hyun, Chief Secretary, and Kim Jae-gyu, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. During the meal, the debate began between Cha Ji-cheol and Kim Jae-kyu, which eventually led to the end of the regime when Kim Jae-kyu killed President Park Chung-hee with unexpected shooting in the middle of the meal. President Park Chung-hee's sudden death brought political chaos to the Democratic Republican Party and the regime. In Huntington's theory of political party institutionalization, institutionalized political parties have regular succession procedures, and there are succession plans at certain times through a systematic selection and successor training process (Huntington, 1968, p. 13). However, Park Chung-hee and the Democratic Republican Party showed the most difficulty in choosing a successor as one of institutionalization. After the general election on June 8, 1967, the main internal issue in the Democratic Republican Party was the internal struggle over successors after the Park Chung-hee era. After Park Chung-hee's political vacuum, civil society and political parties showed confrontations about democratization. When new military officers took over military power after the 1212 incident, Choi Gyu-ha, the acting president, was paralyzed by the military. This situation was immediately followed by expansion of martial law on May 17 in 1980, which led to a military authoritarian regime again. As a result, the internal divisions of the Democratic Republican Party and the leadership crisis have given the military elite officers new reasons for political intervention (Huntington, 1968, pp. 17-18). The Democratic Republican Party was not autonomous from the government as well. New military officers led by General Chun Doo-hwan arrested former regime officials for corruption of Park Chung-hee 's regime. After Kim Jong-pil was arrested, including high-ranking officials, he was released after resignation with dedicating his wealth to the country. Kim Jong-pil left the Party on June 14, 1980 and resigned from the chairman of the party. In this way, the Democratic Republican Party accelerated decline facing the party's internal and external crises. It failed to overcome the power struggle with the new military elites, and finally was dissolved.

3.7.2 Golkar in the era of democratic transition
The challenge arose after the end of the New Order power. There were a lot of encouragement from the public and interest groups to dissolve Golkar, and they pointed Golkar was not suitable party with the trend of reform in all societies (Noer, 2014). Golkar was considered part of the New Order regime, and many people thought Golkar had to be dissolved to make reformation proceed correctly. The insistence on dissolution of Golkar was stated from the grassroots level, and clashes often occurred in masses from organizations to other political parties. Golkar's flags were burned by parties on behalf of reformist groups, and several Regional Representative Council (DPD) offices were burned by the mob. Events held by Golkar were not protected from mass attacks. Facing huge crisis of the party, Golkar tried to change people's concept that Golkar was the same body with the New Order regime, trying to make itself as more public political party. With a new flag indicating Golkar as the public party, although the pressure for dissolution was still high, the Golkar Party could become a participant in the 1999 elections. The leadership of the transitional Golkar Party under the leadership of Akbar Tandjung tried to adjust itself to changes, then the party proclaimed new Golkar which was in same ideals of reformation. The party tried to convince the public that this new Golkar would fight with ideals of reformation and would not restore glory of the previous New Order era. According to Aulia Rachman, Golkar turned into a political party to

prove that new Golkar is not like old Golkar, and new Golkar became more reformative and had new visions: 1. Open, 2. Independent, 3. Democratic, 4. Moderate , 5. Solid, 6. Rooted and Responsive. In an effort to realize its vision and platform, Golkar made missions: First is reinforcing the commitment to absorb, integrate, articulate, and fight for the aspirations & interests of the people, especially those in marginal positions that have received little attention and have been often victims of development. Second is recruiting qualified cadres whom people chose through a system for political or public positions. Third is improving process of education and political communication, which is dialogic and participatory, namely opening to various thoughts, aspirations and criticisms of the public (Rachman, 2006). Under pressure to dissolve Golkar, finally in the 1999 election which was the 1st democratic election after the fall of Suharto, many people predicted that Golkar would lose a lot of votes because Golkar have received help to get votes from the bureaucracy and ABRI's assistance in mobilizing the community to vote for Golkar in previous elections. But reformation made bureaucrats and ABRI unable to support Golkar back in the election. With unexpected results, in the 1999 elections Golkar was in second place under PDI-P which was always in the last rank during previous elections. PDI-P won 35,689,073 votes or 33.74 percent with 153 seats while Golkar won 23,741,758 votes or 22.44 percent with 120 seats. With a large vote and second place even without support from bureaucrats and the military, this showed that Golkar was still rooted and had fanatical voters who continued to vote for Golkar. In the next election in 5 years, Golkar proved that it was still a major party by winning elections in 2004 with 24,480,757 (21.58%) votes or 128 (23.27%) seats in the DPR-RI. The Golkar Party became the only major party which experienced increase in votes among all parties in the election: the Golkar Party's vote increased by 719,355 votes. The victory of the Golkar Party could not be separated from the leadership in the transitional era, which succeeded to get glory again like the Suharto era. The modern Golkar Party does not use power of the government or military for its victory, but Golkar uses party structures and working programs that can steal people's hearts to win the election (Fauzi , 2015, p. 2). While a lot of ruling parties in other countries had difficulty in surviving from decline or dissolution when the authoritarian government collapsed, survival of the Golkar Party from pressures on dissolution and winning votes were an extraordinary achievement. The Golkar in Indonesia showed different adaptability with the Democratic Republican Party in South Korea.

4. Conclusion

In South Korea, President Park Chung-hee's sudden death caused collapse of the government and ruling party: The Democratic Republican Party. In this sense, the party's organization and political position were maintained only by President Park Chung-hee's leadership. The failure to institutionalize the Democratic Republican Party was caused by the will of the supreme ruler who obsessed maintaining long-term regime only. Chaos in the party happened due to sudden death of the president who always pressured opposition parties, civil society groups and civilian politicians who insisted change of power, which led to the collapse of the Democratic Republican Party. The reason for this phenomenon can be explained by loss of legitimacy of the military authoritarian regime, lack of institutionalization and ideological failure of the ruling party. Meanwhile, in the leadership of the Golkar Party, the era of transition emerged a new political culture. The Golkar Party under the leadership of Akbar Tandjung underwent a transformation from an organization that relied on power with the help of bureaucrats and Indonesian military to a modern organization that relied on institutionalized party structures and new visions to win in elections. We must note it is not easy to change an organization from the ruling party of the military authoritarian regime into an independent public party (Tanjung , 2008). Regarding institutionalization of political parties, Samuel P. Huntington argued that institutionalization is the process to have value and stability of the party. Facing similar crises of leaders' absence, Golkar showed outstanding adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence to survive from collapse of the Suharto regime while the Democratic Republican Party must be dismissed due to insufficient institutionalization in adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence after Park Chung-hee's sudden death.

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