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The Fight Against Terrorism in the Sahel from the Perspective of Realism

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Abstract

In recent years, terrorism has evolved as a real cancer in the Sahel. As a result of bad governance in the Sahelian countries, terrorism is one of the major concerns of these countries. Many initiatives have been undertaken by these countries, but the fight against terrorism remains handicapped by the lack of cooperation between the countries of the Sahel but also by foreign strategies that are often incoherent and inefficient. So the only solution to eradicate this phenomenon is the realistic prospect. In other words, the Sahelian countries must seek original, sovereign strategies. The Sahel states must seek a regional military power; strengthen their respective states while taking into account the energy stakes of the fight against terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism, Sahel, Realistic Prospect, Sovereign Strategies, Regional Military Power

1. Introduction

The Sahel is one of the regions of the world that knows an exponential evolution of poverty but also of terrorism. This situation is the result of bad governance, weakness of the Sahel states, lack of regional cooperation, radical ideologies. It can also and above all be explained by the inadequacy of the control strategies in this region. Thus terrorist groups such as (AQIM, Mujao and Ançar Dine) have freely settled in this vast uncontrolled region. Nowadays the Sahel has become the new Eldorado of terrorist groups from all over the world. A veritable hotbed of tensions, the Sahel now lives under banditry, crime, and trafficking of all kinds. Terrorist threats are growing steadily: attacks, hostage-taking, religious extremism, recruitment of child soldiers. In view of the rapid development of terrorism, there is a need to challenge Western strategies and even African initiatives that fail to put an end to this phenomenon that keeps reducing the population of the Sahel day by day. That is why we believe that there is a reason to question why no strategy has succeeded to defeat the terrorism in the Sahel region?. How could the Sahel countries effectively combat it?

2. Definition of concepts

2.1. Realism

The word realism is, first of all, a philosophical concept that dates back to antiquity. It refers to what is real (material) as opposed to what is ideal (idea or spirit). Realism is, therefore, an ontological concept which opposed the nominalists to the idealists in the Middle Ages. According to Jack Donnelly, the term is used in
different ways and in several disciplines [Jack Donnelly, 2005]. So in literature, realism is a current that describes the real concrete. It opposes the romanticism which is rather the expression of feelings or approaches to escape. In international relations, realism is a theory mainly based on the confrontational character of interstate relationships. At this level, the realistic qualifier refers to authors who claim to consider human and social relationships, including political relations as they are and not as we would like them to be. This is a traditional analysis that encourages political power to be sought and to defend national interests (political realism). As a theory of international relations, realism asserts that any State must defend its interests, its sovereignty, increase its power because each state seeks to survive. Having taken his sources from the philosopher Thucydides by way of Hobbes Machiavelli, and Hans Morgenthau, Henri Kissinger or Raymond Aron realism states that the States have no friends but interests to defend.

2.2. Terrorism
The definition of terrorism is a problem that continues to oppose states, researchers, and academics. Indeed terrorism is a very complex and varied phenomenon. That's what Richard says. D. Howard and Reid. L. Sawyer that "it is easier to describe terrorism than to define it" [Russel. Howard and Reid L.Sawyer, 2004]. Terrorism is, therefore, an ambiguous phenomenon that involves several issues because its definition implies politics, religion, law, international relations, etc. That's why Jessica Stern said that defining terrorism is more difficult than an academic exercise [Jessica Stern, 1999]. This difficulty of definition has prompted R. Baxter to say: "We have good reason to regret that the concept of terrorism has been inflicted on us." The term is vague, and it is ambiguous, and, above all, it serves no concrete legal objective' [Richard Baxter, 1974].

Even if there is no universal definition of terrorism, it will be noted that it is not a new phenomenon because in 1939 a study of the treatment of terrorism had shown that terrorism would come from a Latin word: terror. So originally it meant a physical tremor before being perceived as an emotional state of extreme fear. In this sense, some scholars believe that terrorism is a system of terror and it was invented to condemn the regime of terror during the French Revolution. However, in reality, terrorism is not a new fact because its history dates back to Antiquity [Challand, G, A (dir), 2006]. In general, we believe that terrorism is, above all, a terror of violence or a threat exerted by an individual or group on non-combatant (innocent) populations in order to achieve an objective. This violence or threat can be physical, moral, verbal, and psychological.

3. The different issues in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel

3.1. Ideological issues of terrorist groups
Ideological issues are the result of terrorist groups that evolve in several numbers in the Sahel. Especially in the Sahelian band of which the most active are: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Mujao and Anesardine. In general, these groups claim to be motivated by a Muslim religious ideology and thus advance the pretext of the expansion of Islam and even of the Salafism. All these terrorist groups claim to be the Salafist ideology that wants a literalist application of the texts of Islam. This, therefore, precludes any form of interpretation based on human reason and commits the Muslim to live according to the principles of the Koran and the Sunnah of the Prophet [Dominique Thomas, 22 mars 2012]. In other words, the Salafism is like a return to the Muslim tradition as some leaders of the Mujao detract Hamma Ould Mohamed Kheyrou, aka Abou Mehrdad: The jihad will be brought wherever it will be necessary, and it adds that you have to be ready to Everything for God” [Julia Dufour et Claire Kupper, 6 Juillet 2012]. Another leader adds that the sharia is divine justice and we must apply it” [El-Hadj Ben Cissé, avec Boris Thiolay, Express 2012]. It is in this context that these groups want a political use of Islam just to protest against Western modernity [Catherine Gouëset, 25 janvier 2012].

Their aim is to establish an Islamic state, with Sharia as a source of law. The similarity of their motivations is confirmed in an interview given by the head of the MUJAO who said: "As for AQIM and Ançar Dine, it is our brothers with whom we have minute disputes that do not affect the merits" [Ould Khaïrou, 28 Avril 2012]. That
is why Ançar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO were all three present in the three occupied regions of northern Mali (Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu) in early April 2012 [L’express 31 mars 2012, 31 mars 2012].

But in reality, these groups are all bandits groups in search of money. The religious ideology is just a pretext for achieving their hidden goals. Indeed these groups are all involved in drug trafficking, recruiting child soldiers and especially taking hostages. In our opinion, their actions do not reflect any religious motive. For example, if Mujao was created, it is because Iyad Ag Ghaly was denied its integration into MNLA [Boris Thiolay, 12 Avril 2012]. According to Jean-Claude Brisard, specialist of terrorist financing, the estimates of AQIM income from ransoms in the northern region Mali around the 65 million of dollars on 25 October 2011 [Jean-Claude Brisard, 01/02/2013] This amount would be more than 90% of Income of the organization. The valuation of a Western hostage by AQIM is 6.5 million in average AQIM is extremely gifted in this sense because it works both for a Salafism but also for the search for funds through drug trafficking, hostages and illicit trade. AQIM often goes so far as to impose taxes on the traffickers, in exchange for protection or a right of way on the controlled areas in the Sahel.

In addition, the question is that: how they can defend a religion while they are in immorality? We remembered that these terrorist groups are the ones who committed the most imaginable atrocities during their occupation of the northern regions in Mali: Forced marriages rape of women often in the presence of their husbands without counting the amount the banks stripping. At the same time, they claim to defend religious values at the same time they destroy the mausoleums of Timbuktu (UNESCO heritage), and they pocket the money of the churches, bars, and hotels they claim to fight.

3.2. Security issues

3.2.1. Crime and drug trafficking

The Sahel faces a strong and growing insecurity (banditry trafficking of all kinds) by talking about terrorist threats in the Sahel. we also have to talk about the banditry that reigns in this region and which is a major scourge in the development of Terrorism. In fact, the use of the Sahara desert as a transit route for narcotics, including cocaine and cannabis, increases insecurity in this region. Taking advantage of the weakness of the rule of law and of acute poverty in some countries, organized trafficking networks multiply illegal activities (arms and gems smuggling, drugs, etc.) in border areas poorly managed by the state apparatus [Michel Luntumbue, 9 Octobre 2012].

It should also be noted that the Tuareg conflicts in northern Mali and Niger have contributed immensely to the development of terrorism in the Sahel. Many rebellions have converted to terrorism in a formal way, even though we know that all the armed groups in the Sahel (rebellion and terrorist groups) do not differ in anything. However, drug trafficking is a threat to the sovereignty and security of States and undermines the economic, social and cultural structure of society [O.N.U.D.C, 2008, p: 209]. Therefore we can say that the Sahel is the place of global drug trafficking. The latter has grown considerably over the last ten years due to the intercontinental dimensions but also to the high level of corruption and to the extreme poverty of the local population [Djallil Lounnas, 2013-2 N° 216P, 111 -128]. This is why according to the U.N some regions of the continent are now explicitly designated as a hub of international narcotics traffic making the task of these countries more and more complex. According to a report of the CMAIS in 2009. The cocaine trafficking in West and Central Africa amounted to 900 millions of dollars [ONUDC, 2009]. The reality remains difficult to understand considering the number of armed gangs that are growing day by day. But cocaine trafficking is not the only financial resource. Some jihadist networks also benefit from the smuggling of heroin from Afghanistan that is difficult to assess from our jours [CMAIS 2013].

3.2.2. Hostage-taking the massive

Hostage-taking is presented as a popular action by the kidnappers (terrorists). It has a political character because it often mobilizes all state means for its treatment. From this point, we can even talk about a legitimization of
terrorist groups because the release of some hostages requires a whole diplomacy. First, it should be noted that this hostage-taking constitutes a media medium for kidnappers but also a means of pressure [CMAIS] 2013]. Hostage-taking is and remains a source of funding for terrorist organizations in the Sahel. In fact, the Sahel has now become a real "hostage-kidnapping" industry. Between 2004 and 2016 AQIM operated in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria but between 2006 and 2012, AQIM received $60 million of ransoms paid by the hostages' countries’ [Serigne Bamba Gaye 2017].

3.2.3. Recruitment of child soldiers
The recruitment of child soldiers is also a growing phenomenon in the Sahel. Many children are used as soldiers around the world but especially in the Sahel. Many of them are abducted and are victims of violence if they refuse to obey. Others voluntarily join groups or armed forces to escape poverty, defend their community, by a feeling of vengeance or for other reasons. Children are therefore used in fighting and other purposes. While children in many conflicts are directly involved in the fighting, this is not their only role, because girls and boys often carry out support functions that are also extremely dangerous and painful. They are frequently used as porters and carry very heavy loads, including ammunition and wounded. Nowadays these child soldiers are recruited in the north as well as in southern Mali as Remi Carayol said "Fulani, Songhai, mossis or Bambara, they are more and more often recruited as fighters within AQIM and its subsidiaries Sahelian, whose Hierarchy remains dominated by Algerians [Remi Carayol, 01 février 2016]. Some are used as lookouts, messengers or cooks or assigned to other daily tasks. Girls are particularly vulnerable and often used as sex slaves.

4. The international strategic issue of the Sahel
The commitment of foreign powers in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel is shown to be sufficient that terrorism has now become an international issue. For François Bayart Since September 11, 2001, French and American have gradually settled in the idea that Sahelian West Africa was on the way to becoming a new sanctuary for Al-Qaeda [Jean François Bayard, 23 juillet 2010]. Indeed, almost all the powers are already present in the name of some reason. The United States refers to the pretext of the fight against international terrorism. On the other hand, France and the Union generally refer to the defense of human rights. But in reality, these are the simple excuses for accessing energy resources because despite its poverty, the growing insecurity the Sahel remains one of the world's richest regions of energy resources. Its sub-soil contains oil, gas, gold, phosphates, diamonds, copper, iron, coal, nickel, zinc, bauxite, uranium, plutonium, manganese, cobalt, silver, chromium, tin, mineral salts, freshwaters, fish, crustaceans, biological diversity, herds of Livestock, precious wood, etc. [Mohamed Saleck Ould Brahim, 19 Decembre 2010]. It is these resources that continue to attract foreign powers to the Sahel. For John Davis, The Sahel was never a concern of the United States only it is bitter on September 11, 2001, that they turned to the Sahel because they see in this region harsh potential energy after Afghanistan [John Davis, 2007]. The proof is that they do not have a military base in the Sahel yet even if they intervene in the name of counterterrorism through various programs. This is understandable because according to Seraghni the American doctrine is based on unlimited access to African markets, energies, and other strategic resources and securing supplies of raw materials. It is supported militarily in the form of the fight against terrorism. In this context, they weave a military web to occupy useful Africa. It is illustrated by this Obama statement "Africa is more important than ever for the security and prosperity of the international community and for the United States in particular” [Seraghni, 2/4/14].

In view of the facts, we realize that the struggle of Westerners is not sincere, because they have their agendas already predetermined. If the United States intervenes in the Sahel, it is because they see in this region their source of supply after Afghanistan. In fact, the USA has never considered West Africa especially the Sahel. As for France, she has always dreamed of staying in the Sahel. Thus with the war in Mali France has only made its comeback since independence but it has taken advantage to strengthen its position. In Mali, the fight against terrorism has enabled France to resettle comfortably through cooperation agreements and especially mining contracts. The Sahel is exposed to the strategic "calculations" of foreign actors desiring to broaden their
influence and maintain their interests on the African continent under cover of the eradication of Daech terrorist group [Fatiha Mez, 30 décembre, 2017].

5. Blocking the fight against terrorism in the Sahel

5.1. Algerian-Moroccan rivalry

We must recognize that the fight against terrorism is not progressing in the Sahel. Algeria and Morocco are all inescapable in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel today given their strategic positions on the continent. In particular, Algeria should be a source of inspiration for the Sahelian countries because of its experience in the fight against terrorism. Unfortunately, it was the opposite. On the question of the Sahel, Algeria and Morocco turned their backs and took parallel and even competing initiatives. Algeria has always sought to exert a great influence in the Sahel region. Using its diplomatic machine, it was the artisan of the peace agreements between the rebels of Niger, Mali and the respective Governments (1995 and 2005). Just as it was responsible for the establishment in 2010 of the group of so-called "field" countries (Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger), i.e. the main involved actors in the situation in the Sahel, which have taken initiatives such as the creation of Joint Operational Staff Committee (CEMOC) at Tamanrasset in 2010 as well as the Mergers and Liaison Unit (UFL), an Algiers-based information grouping cell. Since 2004, Algeria has also been home to the African Center for studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), established at its initiative within the framework of the African Union. And in order to prevent unnecessary and counterproductive duplication with these cooperation mechanisms, Algeria wished that all initiatives in the direction of the Sahel should complement and not be substituted for this regional approach.

As for Morocco, it takes advantage of its good relations with the EU and its privileged relationship with some of its members such as France and Spain to reposition itself as a true regional power, a counterweight to Algeria. Rabat's main argument is that the EU and Morocco are facing the same terrorist threats from the south, and that, as a result, this country is the reliable and effective interlocutor in the region. In other words, the Moroccan leaders want to show Algeria that any initiative of interest to the Maghreb and the Sahel cannot marginalize Morocco. Morocco goes so far as to take advantage of the difficulties of relations between Algeria and the EU in general and between it and France in particular, to present itself as the credible actor in a fight against terrorism in the Sahel. The threats to security in the Sahel and the measures taken to stop it are transnational in nature, but their intensity differs from one country to another. Sometimes the three Sahel states (Algeria, Libya, and Morocco) have different perceptions of threats and their solutions, as well as the lack of a sub-regional organization. This bad coordinated action is compromising the credibility and the effectiveness of regional initiatives. At the level of the international community (including the EU), coherent and systematic action linking political, security and development aspects is also insufficient [http://eeas.europa.eu/index_fr.htm].

This situation constitutes a real handicap in the counterterrorism in the Sahel because these two countries all have influences on the countries of the Sahel. The example in Mali we all know that Algeria is a strategic partner, but on the other hand, Morocco has recently signed an agreement with Mali in the fight against terrorism.

5.2. The weakness of the Sahel states

One of the problems of the Sahel is the weakness of the States. By definition a weak state is a state incapable of ensuring its own security and of guaranteeing its sovereignty as the English peoples say "fall State" [W. Zartman, 1995, p. 5]. For some years now, the media and politicians and a large number of "experts have described the Sahel as a grey zone", that is to say, a little space, under, poorly or uncontrolled, by "fragile", "failed" or "bankrupt" states, or even "rogue" [Julien Brachet, Juillet 2013]. Such a state is vulnerable and remains exposed to all violations, the more serious it is threatened with extinction. This is exactly the characteristic of the Sahelian countries. After fifty years of independence, the Sahel states are still unable to secure their own security. This situation is explained by the absence of a state in much of the Sahelo-Saharan space, the inability of the security structures to control the vast, very often desert, areas and to meet the basic
needs of People living there (education, health, food, socio-economic opportunities). This situation has generated a sense of fluctuation, abandonment and leads to those people wanting to assume their own destinies, hence the use of terrorist organizations and the development of devices of religious or clan solidarity. It must be recognized that this situation exposes the people not only to the terrorists but also to the criminal forces that take advantage of them to gain their minds. It should also be noted that the weakness of the Sahel states also leads to the uncontrolled movement of people and various property (licit or illicit) and thus promotes the expansion of radical Islamism and the establishment of links (ideological and operational) and increasingly narrow and dangerous synergies between different criminal or terrorist groups.

However, it should be noted that the weakness of States is linked to the bad governance of the Sahel states, nepotism, favoritism, clientelism, corruption erected in the system. Bad governance endangers the problem of insecurity, and the latter in turn, therefore, brings about increasing instability and compromises all the democratic achievements. That is why between twelve Sahelian countries only two had escaped a military coup in 45 years; and at the ECOWAS level, only four out of 25 member countries have not been affected for 30 years by a violent conflict at or within borders [Mohamed Saleck Ould Brahim, 19 Décembre 2010]. Official development assistance is sometimes taken hostage by the heads of State. In this context, John Davis said that poverty is not directly pushing men into terrorism and killings, but it weakens institutions through corruption that weakens the state by making it vulnerable to terrorist networks and drugs. This is why the Sahel is usually the place of conflicts (rebellions), social tensions of coups of States for example (Mauritania-August 2005 and August 2008), (Guinea Bissau-March 2009 and April 2010) and (Niger-February 2010) (Burkina Faso in 2015. and Mr. Déby Since February 1991) Mali 1990 and 2012. In the same logic, bad governance also leads to social unrest that can result from discontent and frustration in the population or part of it and can lead to coups (like the one that Mali experienced on 22 March 2012. In the same logic, William Ansovo adds that the level of widespread corruption in the Sahel has affected many sectors of these States, particularly the most sensitive, the defense system and that of security [William Assanvo, Juillet 2012].

This same bad governance is developing in another way in the Sahel in the form of national terrorism, more precisely in the center of Mali where peoples are victims of injustice, deprived of their fundamental rights engage in a radical Islam in the Delta Niger and the region of Mopti. These new groups of identity are the result of the absence of the Malian state and above all the inability to satisfy the basic needs of these populations for whom terrorist leaders such as Amadou Koufa are messiahs. It should be mentioned the inability of the Malian state to control the religious phenomenon especially in the context where the Sahel is experiencing a rapid expansion of Islam [John Davis, 2007]. The religious are left to themselves without any control, and few are the states of the G5 Sahel who know the exact number of their religious buildings because they are still growing and sometimes constitute refuges or training camps for terrorists. Moreover one of the consequences of the weakness of the States remains the interference of other powers as in the Sahel with French [Kamal Bayramzadeh, Septembre 2014].

5.3. The anarchic proliferation of strategies
In a certain way, it can be said that the Sahel is now the laboratory of Western strategies. Any country is allowed to finance and launch a counter-terrorism program. Among others the MCA we have the PSI (Pan Sahel Initiative). The Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) The EuCap Sahel, Operation Liza, and G5 Sahel. Especially the MCA was a conditioned aid from the United States towards African countries that want to support them in their counterterrorism policy. All of these programs were generally endowed with large sums of money, but they remained in total inadequacy with the main objective and above all the realities of the populations at the base. They were much more focused on development, democracy, the strengthening of human rights that cannot be guaranteed without good security. At the base of this, we must also note the contradictions between French and Americans in their approaches to combating terrorism. The French generally fight for the release of their hostages while the Americans declare that they do not negotiate with a terrorist. They are well aware that these strategies cannot prevent terrorist threats in the Sahel, but they nonetheless seek to execute their
neo-colonial agendas. Indeed none of these powers has adopted the same anti-terrorist strategies at home. Why have countries like the United States, France, Canada not replicated their national strategies in the Sahel or Mali?

The paradox is that terrorism develops as the strategies multiply. However, it was the collapse of Mali that really revealed all the inadequacy and limitations of American programs designed to improve the effectiveness of the countries of the Sahel. Despite nearly 100 million dollars a year in favor of the TSCTP since its launch to which is added bilateral aid [Henri Plagnol et François Loncle, 6 mars 2012]. All these programs seem to have failed in their objectives. Indeed not only has there been a coup d'etat in Bamako but also the north of the country was occupied and administered by armed groups and terroristes. What is important to underline is that even some of the units formed and equipped by Washington have defected including the leader of the military junta Amadou Haya Sanogo who had already benefited from the American program. However, the first consequence of Western interference is the occupation of the Sahelian states, the "weakness" of which crocodile tears are shed, evoking their sovereignty, their representativeness and their credibility in the presence of their citizens. For François Bayart for several years, Washington and Paris are waging war in West Africa that does not say its name yet. Considering the terrorist threats today we can say that: French and Americans are going to fail on the ground. Their firepower and intelligence must not deceive us. Indeed when we remember the cases of Somalia, of Afghanistan we know that they are weak in terms of asymmetric conflicts. On the contrary, their strategies have often favored the emergence of the enemy through media coverage because, by dint of screaming Wolf, it is likely to bring him to where he did not spawn. That is why for Jean François Bayard West Africa can play an important role in the field of security especially with his experience in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. In this perspective, the so-called Secret hunters’ societies, i.e., the Dozo {hunters}, are already available for this task, of which we dare not imagine the human cost [Jean François Bayard, Septembre 2014].

6. The realistic perspective of the fight against terrorism

6.1. Sovereign and original strategies
In general, the Sahel states must first rethink their security systems and in particular their counter-terrorism strategies because terrorism is a consequence of weakness. "Jihadists are only strong because the States are weak’ as Michel Goya said [Michel Goya, 21 juin 2013]. For that, we recommend a complete overhaul of the current strategies. In other words, the Sahel states must have their original strategies to combat terrorism because, beyond geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations, European and French methods do not take into account all the Realities in Africa. Their strategies are tainted with ideology and pitfalls for the Sahelian countries because they are the expression of their interests. They are also a trap because they hinder the fight against terrorism. Moreover, the countries of the Sahel must also know that the multiplication of methods kills strategies. That is why terrorism continues to grow in the Sahel because African initiatives are often eclipsed by American and European strategies. In this way, African countries also have to be financially responsible. They must be able to take care of themselves and not rely on Westerners as we see with the African Union and ECOWAS. The most recent case is the G5 Sahel which is slow to implement for lack of funding. The search for sovereignty is obligatory by taking into account the intellectual and financial self-management. The countries of the Sahel need to know that as long as the West finances it will always have to say.

In his study, the sociologist Roland Marchal (CNRS-CERI), arguably the best specialist in the horn, has shown how the Somalian Shebab have acquired their position: "She has succeeded in transforming a group organization into a force that controls now 80% of the central and southern territory of Somalia, and even more so in terms of population. Instead of weakening the Shebab, the counter-terrorist strategy strengthened them" [Roland Marchal, 13 Juillet 2010].

6.2. Strengthening the Sahel states
There is no diabolical solution to defeat terrorism in the Sahelian countries. As terrorism is the result of state weakness, the Sahelian countries must strengthen their military power. They must seek to control the vast desert spaces that inhabit armed groups, terrorist groups, and traffickers. Otherwise, it is necessary for the States to be
more close to the populations. In the same logic, there is the need to fight against corruption poverty because it is necessary to know that terrorist groups often have a lot of money and good position to convince people. For financial reasons, some people become hosts, accomplices of terrorists with money. Others become their guides and others voluntarily lead their children to them to be recruited. The anchoring of terrorism and armed violence is now a reality in the Sahel. As people feel abandoned by the central authorities, they are willing to live with terrorists or remain indifferent to the state. According to the report of a judge who lived the horrors of Timbuktu in Mali, they promise up to six hundred thousand CFA franc (90 Euros) per month [El-Hadj Ben Cissé, et Boris Thiolay 2012]. This moral weakening of Central Powers is a powerful ingredient of instability. It creates feelings of abandonment and exclusion. Throughout the Sahelian band, large tribes (Pouhls, Kanouris, Toubou, etc.) feel marginalized in their geographical areas. Asa consequences of doubtful governance, the retrivalisation, and cracking of countries, along ethnic, religious and geographical origin lines encourage terrorist vocations among the youngest. In Mali, this is generating ethnic conflicts, especially between Pouhls and Dogon. Most of these young people are out of work, and they are very limited in the socio-political system. That is why Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, president of the S4 Centre, said: In the Sahel, two categories of violence are superimposed. First, we have States violence against a part of their citizens but also terrorist's violence, that threatens the States which often helped to create it [Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Octobre 2016]. This includes the good distribution of resources but also the creation of jobs for young people the fight against marginalization and even injustice. Considering this phenomenon, we believe that the Sahel states must be realistic and accountable, in other words, they must avoid the old strategies that were based on partner development programs. These programs have often caused the laziness and illicit enrichment of some as compared to others. In fact, many terrorist groups are benefiting from humanitarian organizations to finance terrorist activities. It is, therefore, necessary to develop but the one that's coming from the Sahelian states.

6.3. The search for regional military power

The realistic perspective of the fight against terrorism must lead the Sahel states towards the search for a military power within the framework of regional cooperation. We thus share the view of Mohamed Saleck Ould Brahim when he says that the fight against terrorism must be done with concerted actions, meticulously prepared with new terms of exchange in the field of communication, cooperation, Information and without impeding the military reinforcement of each country. The countries of the fields must, therefore, have a common perception of interests and threats [Mohamed Saleck Ould Brahim, 19 Decembre 2010]. They must be able to defend and protect their interests against the westerners. In other words, any strategy must be in line with the interests and realities of the Sahelian countries. The G5 Sahel would be a good initiative, but we believe that he is already dead because his whole life is the responsibility of the external partners in terms of funding. We are not against the intervention of the Western powers, such as Barkane Operation and Minusma, but they must be preceded by the armed forces of the Sahel. An answer must be given to the asymmetric strategy of terrorists. For the neorealist of international relations, within the international system, states play roulette, they are in the "Quest for Power," and the winner is the one who has more than the others, in absolute value. "International politics is a game whose ultimate price is security, and the States are the main players" For this it is necessary to multiply the number of state security agents in all the territories of the Sahel, to look for the latest generation of military devices, to stop banditry and to cross-border crime. The Sahel states must be in a position of defense against Western predators and offensive against terrorist groups.

The Sahelian countries must seek military power in accordance with the realistic thinking that all States seek to survive in the anarchy of the international system in which the first source of security comes from inter-conflict States and therefore the only method for States is to enlarge their power [Edward Smith]. Whether we say it or not all States are enemies, rivals between them as say Hobbes Homo homini lupus "Man is a wolf for man" so in the context of regional cooperation the state of the Sahel also have to take into account their interests As the European Union defends its own. However, in the face of the predatory powers that are pretending to enslave the Sahel, all the countries of the Sahel must unite, to form a bloc against their neo-colonial agendas [BACHAR Issoufou,2015]. "The Nigerian security system can do nothing against Al Qaeda for whom there are many opportunities. Trough this word the former diplomat, Bachar, was inviting the Sahel States to be aware of the
nuisance capacity of the African branch of Al Qaeda. Indeed, in mid-December 2008, two Canadian diplomats, Robert Fowler, UN special envoy to Niger and his colleague Louis Gay were abducted by AQIM in the Tillabéri region about 40 Km west from Niamey. On 22 January 2009, AQIM reoffended by removing four European tourists from the Mali-Niger border zone. By these two operations, AQIM highlighted the vulnerability of the Nigerian state already weakened by the armed conflict against the Tuareg "rebels."

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that terrorism is developing in the Sahel because it is still poorly remedied until then. Indeed, the fight against terrorism in the Sahel is based on Western strategies that most often ignore the realities of African countries. That is why the new strategy against terrorism in the Sahel must be based on the realistic approach. This approach makes it possible to understand that this question of counterterrorism is partly based on the calculation of interest of foreign powers. So as long as the games of interest of the powers are not resolved, terrorism will not end in the Sahel.

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Abreviations
AQIM; Alquaida in the Islamic Maghreb
Mujao: Mouvement pour l'unité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest
MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
UNESCO: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO
CMAIS Mediterranean Company for Strategic Analysis and Intelligence
ONUDC Office des Nations-Unies Contre la Drogue et le Crime
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
TSCTI: The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative
MCA: Millennium Challenge Accourt),
PSI: Pan Sahel Initiative
UFL: Unite de fusion et de liaison
EU: European union
G5: Group of five